Mtv Networks the Arabian Challenge Essay Example

Mtv Networks: the Arabian Challenge Essay ICMR Case Collection Co p y Icfai Center for Management Research MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge o D . N ot BSTR294 Teaching Note ? 2009, Icfai Center for Management Research. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means- electronic or mechanical, without permission. To order copies, call +91-40-2343-0462/63 or write to Icfai Center for Management Research, Plot # 49, Nagarjuna Hills, Hyderabad 500 082, India or email [emailprotected] rg. Website: www. icmrindia. org BSTR/294 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge TEACHING NOTE ABSTRACT Co p y MTV Networks (MTVN) had over the years developed a reputation for its ability to provide localized content without diluting what MTV stood for. However, the company faced the most challenging test in late 2007 with its launch of MTV Arabia in the Middle East, which some experts considered as the biggest launch in the channelà ¢â‚¬â„¢s history. While the market in the Middle East offered MTVN with huge opportunities due to its huge youth populace, MTV’s controversial content that was known for angering religious, political, and conservative communities could easily backfire in the conservative environment prevalent in the region. On the other hand, too much localization to suit the tastes of the region could dilute MTV’s global brand. The case discusses in detail the strategy adopted by MTVN to enter and expand in the Middle East and also the challenges faced by the channel. The case will help the students to: t TEACHING OBJECTIVES TARGET AUDIENCE Understand the issues and challenges in entering and expanding operations in new markets which were culturally different from the organizations home/traditional/existing markets. †¢ Understand the pros and cons of entering a new market with a standardized/adapted product to suit local preferences. †¢ Analyze MTVN’s strategy in the Middle East, ident ify challenges and explore strategies that the channel could adopt in the future D o N †¢ This case is meant for students of the MBA/MS level programs in the Business Strategy curriculum. We will write a custom essay sample on Mtv Networks: the Arabian Challenge specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Mtv Networks: the Arabian Challenge specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Mtv Networks: the Arabian Challenge specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer The case is also suitable for International Business/International Marketing/Brand Management curriculum. TEACHING APPROACH AND STRATEGY This case can be used effectively in classroom discussions as well as in distance learning programs. In the classroom mode, the case moderator can initiate the discussion by giving a brief introduction about the MTV and the channels experience in global markets. This can be followed by a discussion on the localization strategy adopted by MTV in various markets and the challenges it faced while lauching in the Middle East. The students can further analyze the strategy adopted by MTV in the Middle East and the challenges it faced in expanding its operations in the region. The moderator can take the discussion further with the help of the following questions. 1 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge 1. Experts felt that one of the biggest challenges faced by MTV while launching MTV Arabia was the prevalent culture in the Arab world. Discuss the Arab culture. How is it expected to pose a challenge to MTV? 2. Critically analyze MTV’s strategy in the Middle East. Comment on its entry strategy and also its strategy of providing mixed content to the market. Do you think MTV will be able to succeed in this market? Suggested Student Assignment: Do a SWOT analysis of MTV Arabia. What should the company do to mitigate the risks while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the market? ANALYSIS 1. Experts felt that one of the biggest challenges faced by MTV while launching MTV Arabia was the prevalent culture in the Arab world. Discuss the Arab culture. How is it expected to pose a challenge to MTV? Co p y The Arab world contains 22 countries – Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen – and stretches from Morocco across Northern Africa to the Persian Gulf. The Arab world derives its strategic importance from the fact that around 60% of the earth’s oil reserves are at or near the Arabian Peninsula. For MNCs, the Arab world’s teeming youth population is another attraction. In the Middle East, 65 percent of the people are under 25 years of age. When compared with the demographics in Western countries, this fact has strong implications for businesses. N ot The Arab countries are religiously and ethnically diverse. The Arab world is a location of several world religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) and a multitude of ethnic and linguistic groups. However, the predominant religion is Islam, and Arabic the dominant language. To be an Arab is a cultural trait rather than a racial one. Arab history and culture are based on tribalism. Some aspects of Arab culture are discussed here: Arab Worldview – It is based upon six concepts: Atomism: Arabs tend to focus on parts rather than on the whole. They tend to see the world and events as isolated incidents, snapshots, and particular moments in time. †¢ Faith: Arabs usually believe that almost all things in life are controlled by the will of God (fate) rather than by human beings. †¢ Wish Vs Reality: Arabs express emotion in a forceful and animated fashion. Their desire for modernity is contradicted by a desire for tradition (especially Islamic tradition). †¢ Importance of Justice and Equality: Arabs value justice and equality among Muslims, and to a lesser degree to others. All actions taken by non-Arabs will be weighed against tradition and religious standards. †¢ Family Vs Self: Arabic communities are tight-knit groups made up of even stronger family groups. Arabs tend to consider family pride and honor more important than individual honor. †¢ Paranoia: Many in the Arab world tend to be suspicious of any Western interest in or intent on their land. D o †¢ 2 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge Arab Customs †¢ Shame and honor: Honor, pride, and dignity are at the core of â€Å"shame† societies, such as the Arabs. For instance, admitting an error or lack of knowledge on a subject is distasteful to an Arab, as any admission of weakness (muruwwa) is equated with failure to be manly. Constructive criticism can, therefore, be taken as an insult. †¢ Family: The family is the center of honor, loyalty, and reputation for Arabs. Arab families are patriarchal in nature. †¢ Personal space: It is a high-contact culture. Most Arabs do not share the American/Western concept of â€Å"personal space† in public situations, and in private meetings or conversations. Stepping or leaning away may be taken as an offense. However, the rules are exactly the opposite while dealing with women. †¢ Socialization and trust: Arabs give a lot of importance to hospitality and allocate plenty of time for refreshment before attempting to engage in business. It is important to first establish respect and trust. When conducting business, it is customary to first shake the hand of all males present, taking care not to grip too firmly. Western Co p Arab y Arab Perspective Vs. Western Perspective Center of everything. (Father has first and last word. ) Important but not as central to individual. Friends Periphery, but courteous to all. Core to some, important to most. Honor Very important amongst Arabs. Honor will be protected and defended at all costs. Typically not as important. Shame Shame (especially concerning family) – avoided at all costs, insults and criticism taken very seriously. Typically not as important. Time Less rigid. Approach to time is much more relaxed and slower than that in Western cultures. Very structured, deadlines must be met. Religion D o N ot Family Central to all things. Varies with individuals, very personal, not discussed in polite conversation. Society Family / tribe is most important Individual rights. Government Most governments are secular, but still emphasize religion. Purpose is to protect rights and improve standard of living. Age Age and wisdom honored. Youth and beauty praised. Wealth Wealth honored in both cultures. Wealth honored in both cultures. Adapted from http://graphics8. nytimes. com/images/blogs/thelede/posts/arabculture. pdf However, it must be emphasized that there is no â€Å"one† Arab culture or society. The Arab world is full of rich and diverse communities, groups, and cultures. Differences exist not only among countries, but within countries as well. For instance, though Arab women are typically subordinate to men in their societies, the extent varies by country. The most restrictive conditions exist on the Arabian Peninsula, and the most relaxed conditions exist in the urban areas of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Moreover, what may be acceptable in cosmopolitan Dubai may not be acceptable in other parts of the UAE. 3 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge Any discussion regarding the culture of a group cannot get under way without some amount of generalization. However, while generalizations provide some insights on culture, they should be treated with caution and one should steer clear of stereotypes and misconceptions. Many feel that young people irrespective of their culture and nationality have similar tastes where music, clothes, computers, and issues with their parents are concerned. For instance, a recent study of Arab and Western youth, carried out by Penn, Schoen, and Berland Associates Inc. and The Nielsen Company, found numerous similarities between the two groups. Both Arab and Western youth placed equal importance on family and friends. Their consumer and lifestyle habits were found to be quite similar with both the groups indulging in similar activities, using similar technologies and having similar lifestyle habits. Both worried about their appearances and spent the majority of their disposable incomes on going out and shopping for clothes and shoes. Global brands such as Sony, iPod, Toyota, Nike, Nokia, Toshiba, McDonald’s, and Ford were viewed favorably by both the Arab and Western young people, and both viewed Europe as the top desired travel destination. However, the study also revealed certain differences. Some of the key differences identified are given here. Western youth were found to be generally pessimistic about the future, while Middle Eastern youth were generally optimistic. †¢ Religion was seen to be â€Å"enormously important† to Middle Eastern youth when compared to their Western peers. †¢ National identity and traditional values were extremely important to Arab youth, but not to their peers in the West. For Arab youth, â€Å"loss of traditional values and culture† was identified as one of the top three biggest challenges facing the world today, along with rising cost of living and corruption in government. †¢ Arab youth generally admired political, religious, and business leaders, while Western youth do not. †¢ Arab youth wanted to â€Å"make a difference,† while Western youth mostly wanted to â€Å"get ahead. † †¢ Middle East and Western male youths had very different opinions about gender equality in the workplace, with less than 6 in 10 Middle East males favoring it. 1 o N ot Co p y †¢ D MTV and the challenges posed by the prevalent culture MTVN had recognized the huge opportunity for growth in the Middle East. Considering that MTV was a youth brand, entering the market provided MTVN with the opportunity to tap the teeming youth population in the region. However, the main challenge the network faced was with regard to its controversial content. Its sexually explicit content had created controversies even in the Western markets, considered to be more tolerant. In view of the culture prevailing in the Arab world, the MTV fare was expected to kick up a storm. The culture in the largely Muslim Arab world is conservative. Gender separation is a key aspect of the culture and women are required to maintain their distance from men. Any public display of intimacy between men and women is strictly forbidden by the Arab social code. Women have little role in business or entertainment. They are also expected to cover their whole body, head, and face with veils/robes for reasons of modesty. The honor/shame aspect of the culture also implies that people who do not adhere to these rules bring shame to the family/tribe. Arabs have been known to react violently in such situations, with instances of honor killings also being reported. They also 1 â€Å"The Global Generation: A http://arabyouthsurvey. com/about. html. Cross-Cultural 4 Study of Arab and Western Youth,† MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge ake insults and criticism very seriously and can react in an extreme way to what they perceive as an insult. For instance, calling someone a ‘dog’ or showing the sole of the feet are considered grave insults and can evoke extreme reactions. So, it’s not particularly difficult to see why MTV had a major challenge on its hands. Its content (music videos and reality shows) could offend the cultura l sensibilities of people in the Arab world especially in terms of Excessive skin show †¢ Intermingling of genders †¢ Use of disparaging or swear words †¢ Off-color or obscene attempts at humor References to alcohol †¢ Discussion on religion, politics †¢ Gestures such as finger pointing, showing the soles of feet, etc. y †¢ ot Co p Another challenge before MTV was that the Arabs were generally considered paranoid by Western standards and they tended to be suspicious of any Western interest. MTV, in a way, stood for what the Arab world most reviled about Western/American culture. While MTV might argue that the values that it stood for were relevant to youth throughout the world, it may still be perceived as something contrary to Islamic ideals and the Arab culture. The launch of MTV in the Arab world could easily be perceived as an imposition of Western culture. Fanatics, or those who pretend to be guardians of Islam, could easily rake up the issue and create a lot of trouble for MTV. To complicate matters, the anti-American sentiments prevalent in a section of the Arab world too could pose steep challenges to MTV. o N One may argue that with globalization and the advancements in information and communication technology, youth across the globe share similar aspirations and consumption behavior. And that a section of the youth population in the Middle East did want MTV. However, ignoring the cultural differences is fraught with danger, as the Arab youth consider religion â€Å"enormously important† and â€Å"loss of traditional values and culture† as a key challenge. D 1. Critically analyze MTV’s strategy in the Middle East. Comment on its entry strategy and also its strategy of providing mixed content to the market. Do you think MTV will be able to succeed in this market? Operating internationally is usually fraught with political, technological, and socioeconomic uncertainties. The risks become higher when the company is venturing into a market that is very different from its home country/traditional markets. We have already seen that the business environment in the Middle East is very different from that in the Western countries. Entering this market with a brand as controversial as MTV was a huge challenge. Nevertheless, MTVN was able to launch the brand in the Middle East without creating any major controversies and it seemed to be making all the right strategic moves. MTVN’s extensive experience in operating in the global market came in handy while overcoming the challenges in entering the Middle East. It scanned the market well and decided on an entry strategy in partnership with a strong local player. With the help of the local partner, it researched the market further to fine tune its strategy. This helped the network gain important consumer insights and also provided it with the opportunity to allay the doubts/fears of the people on the launch of MTV. In doing so, the network recognized the importance of honor and dignity to the Arabs. This was also a good move as there is a long-standing tradition based on the Quran and the sayings of Muhammad whereby Arabs consult with senior members of the ruling families and/or the community regarding business decisions. 5 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge MTVN’s mixed content strategy (combination of music and other content/standardized and localized content) had been quite successful globally. In MTV Arabia, it localized its offering further by offering more Arabic content and also making certain other changes, such as, †¢ Minimal use of content that could cause controversy (skimpily-clad women, use of expletives, etc. ). A culturally sensitive team recruited from various countries from the Middle East was given the responsibility of ensuring this. This meant that some of the more controversial programs and videos, which are standard fare in other markets, were not aired on MTV Arabia. Arabic equivalents of popular reality shows were launched with careful consideration of socio-cultural issues. Arabic subtitles were provided for English language content. †¢ Considering that Islam was the dominant religion of the Middle East, MTV also gave an animated call for prayer during Namaaz (prayer) time. During the holy month of Ramadan, MTV Arabia also dropped its music videos. 2 Religion commonly underlies both moral and economic norms. In a region where religion is central to everything, such gestures could create goodwill and insensitivity may lead to extreme reaction. Co p y In addition to this, MTVN projected MTV Arabia as an Arab channel by the Arabs, which would help bring to the fore the music talent in the Arab world and also give a voice to the Arab youth. It made it clear from an early stage that MTV respected the Arab culture and said that the channel would help debunk various misconceptions regarding Arabs and the Arab world. Its decision to provide the Arab youth with a platform to showcase their talent was a good move considering the Arab youths’ desire to â€Å"make a difference†. ot The role of the local partner was very important, considering the business environment in the Middle East. The Arab Media Group was very well connected and this helped overcome political and regulatory hurdles to a great extent. It also helped the network gain entrance into Arab homes — a place that is considered very private by the Arabs — and so get consumer insights. D o N All in all, MTVN had an excellent public relations strategy and did megamarketing3 quite well. This not only helped it to tap the growing number of people in the Middle East who were exposed (and accustomed) to the Western lifestyle, but also the huge youth base that had tastes, preferences, and aspirations similar to their peers in other developed nations. MTVN’s decision to launch Nickelodeon Arabia in 2008 just a few months after the launch of MTV Arabia was another good move. This not only put MTVN in a position to tap the huge population of children in the Middle East, but also helped it strengthen its business relations with the local partner. Needless to say, it also provided MTVN with the opportunity to catch them young. MTV has, thus far, managed its strategy in the Middle East in a commendable way. In a market that was fed on Arabic pop music, it popularized Arabic hip-hop, a blend of Western-style hip-hop with both English and Arabic lyrics. Its ability to steer clear of controversy is commendable considering the culture in the region. However, while moving ahead, the MTVN faces a number of challenges. The numerous Arab music channels already in the market pose serious challenges to MTV. Many of these channels ape MTV and have very good knowledge of the market and excellent connections, and in such circumstances MTV’s strategy to provide a highly localized offering can prove to be disadvantageous. There is the potential threat of brand dilution, and MTV Arabia may actually find it difficult to differentiate itself. Another problem is the diversity in the Middle East. The network is faced with the question of how to ensure that the youth in Dubai and those in Jeddah relate to it in the same way. 2 3 http://www. arabianbusiness. com/528973-mtv-arabia-to-drop-music-videos-in-ramadan Megamarketing is a term coined by marketing expert, Philip Kotler, to describe the type of marketing activity required when it is necessary to manage elements of the firms external environment (governments, the media, pressure groups, etc) as well as the other marketing variables. 6 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge Notwithstanding the challenges, MTV with its extensive experience in the global market, seems to be in a good position to consolidate its position in the Middle East. It has been associated (positively and negatively) with bringing about changes in the culture in the markets it is aired. It is known to continuously push the limits (albeit in subtle ways) of what acceptable content is and what is not. For instance, it started out on a cautious note in India, a country in which many of the things that MTV stood for were considered taboo. The content it airs today in India would have been absolutely unacceptable when it was launched in the 1990s. MTV can do the same thing in the Middle East too. D o N ot Co p y MTVN’s strategy in global markets has been to initially tie up with a local partner and in course of time acquire the local company. But in this case, MTVN will be well-served if it adopts a more long term relationship with the Arab Media Group. Arabs value justice and equality among Muslims, and to a lesser degree among others. To cite one example, in late 2002, an unidentified man walked into a McDonald’s fast food restaurant in Saudi Arabia and set it on fire. The country’s interior minister was quoted as saying, â€Å"It’s an attack against the property of a Muslim, which constitutes an unacceptable act that we will fight using all possible means. †4 So, the risks associated in doing business in the Middle East could be significantly lower with a local partner. 4 â€Å"McDonald’s Torched in Saudi Attack,† www. bbc. c. uk, November 21, 2002. 7 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge References Suggested Readings: 1. Dirk Smillie, â€Å"Tuning in First Global TV Generation,† The Christian Science Monitor, June 4, 1997. 2. Kerry Capell, Catherine Belton, Tom Lowry, Manjeet Kripalani, Brian Bremner, and Dexter Roberts, â€Å"MTV’s World,† BusinessWeek, February 18, 2002. 3. â€Å"MTV to Launch Music TV Channels in Three Baltic States,† www. eubusiness. com, March 6, 2006. 4. Faisal Abbas, â€Å"Q with Showtime Arabias CEO Peter Einstein,† www. asharqe. com, June 29, 2006. 5. Faisal Abbas, â€Å"MTV Eyes Middle East Market,† www. asharq-e. com, August 8, 2006. 6. Brad Nemer, â€Å"How MTV Channels Innovation,† BusinessWeek, November 6, 2006. 7. â€Å"Arabian Television Network Partners with MTV to Launch MTV Arabiya,† www. ediame. com, December 27, 2006. y 8. Michael Learmonth, â€Å"MTV Maps Mideast Move,† www. variety. com, December 27, 2006. Co p 9. Iain Akerman, â€Å"MTV Hires Two Agencies for Launch of MTV Arabiya,† www. brandrepublic. com, May 23, 2007. 10. Salman Dossari, â€Å"A Talk With MTV Vice Chairman Bill Roedy,† www. as harq-e. com, July 23, 2007. 11. Ali Jaafar, â€Å"MTV Arabia Ready to Rock Middle East,† www. variety. com, September 25, 2007. ot 12. â€Å"MTV Arabia to be Launched Soon,† www. oceancreep. com, October 8, 2007. 13. Kerry Capell, â€Å"The Arab World Wants Its MTV,† www. businessweek. om, October 11, 2007. N 14. Lynne Roberts, â€Å"MTV Set for Middle East launch,† www. arabianbusiness. com, October 17, 2007. Launch Nickelodeon Arabia,† o 15. Stuart Kemp, â€Å"MTV, Arab Media to www. hollywoodreporter. com, October 17, 2007. D 16. Andrew Edgecliffe Johnson, â€Å"MTV Targets Muslim Countries as it Tunes in to Local Audiences,† www. theaustralian. news. com, October 18, 2007. 17. â€Å"Arab Media Group and MTV Networks International to Launch Nickelodeon Arabia in 2008,† www. ameinfo. com, October 20, 2007. 18. Von Andrew Edgecliffe Johnson, â€Å"MTV Tunes in to a Local Audience,† www. td. de, October 26, 2007, 19. â€Å"MTV Arabia to Launch November 17,† www. middleeastevents. com, October 27, 2007. 20. Ali Jaafar, â€Å"MTV Arabia Announces Lineup,† www. variety. com, October 28, 2007. 21. â€Å"MTV Arabia to Launch November 17,† www. mediame. com, October 28, 2007. 22. Irene Lew, â€Å"MTV Arabia to Launch in November,† www. worldscreen. com, October 29, 2007. 23. Sarah Raper Larenaudie, â€Å"MTV’s Arab Prizefight,† www. time. com, November 2, 2007. 24. Jolanta Chudy, â€Å"MTV’s Arab Net Thinking Locally,† www. hollywoodreporter. com, November 6, 2007. 8 MTV Networks: The Arabian Challenge 25. Matt Pomroy, â€Å"The Revolution Will be Televised,† www. arabianbusiness. com, November 15, 2007. 26. â€Å"Akon and Ludacris Dazzle The Desert in their Middle East Debuts to Celebrate the Launch of MTV Arabia,† www. dubaicityguide. com, November 16, 2007. 27. Adam Sherwin, â€Å"MTV Arabia to Feature Regional Talent and Tone Down Network’s Risque Content,† www. timesonline. co. uk, November 16, 2007. 28. Simeon Kerr and Peter Aspden, â€Å"MTV Arabia Beams ‘Bling’ to Gulf,† www. ft. com, November 17, 2007. 29. â€Å"MTV Launches New Arabic Service,† www. ews. bbc. co. uk, November 18, 2007. 30. â€Å"MTV Looks to Conquer Middle East Market,† www. aol. in, November 18, 2007. 31. â€Å"â€Å"MTV Arabia†: Will It Work? † www. scopical. com, November 19, 2007. 32. â€Å"MTV Aims to Win over Middle East,† www. cnn. com, November 19, 2007. 33. â€Å"Muslim Hip-hop Turban Wrote, That’s Good,† www. reuters. donga. com, November 19, 2007. Co p y 34. Barbara Surk, â€Å"MTV for Young Arab is Less Naughty,† www. cincinnati. com, November 21, 2007. 35. Barbara Surk, â€Å"MTV Launches Arab Music Video Channel,† www. theeagle. com, November 22, 2007. 36. Tamara Walid, â€Å"Finally Got My MTV,† www. arabianbusiness. com, November 22, 2007. 37. â€Å"Will the MTV Brand Change the Middle East? † www. brandchannel. com, December 2, 2007. ot 38. Irene Lew, â€Å"MTVNI Ups Singh,† www. worldscreen. com, April 30, 2008. 39. Dana El Baltaji, â€Å"I Want My MTV,† www. arabmediasociety. com, May 11, 2008. N 40. www. topfive. com 41. www. en. wikipedia. org 42. www. mtva. com D Book: o 43. www. viacom. com Helen Deresky, International Management: Managing Across Borders and Cultures (6th Edition), (Pearson Prentice Hall, Oct 2007) 9

Policemen of the World essays

Policemen of the World essays The United States are primarily the policemen of the world. If there is a conflict in the world that we feel remotely attracted to, we will deploy troops to that area. Due to this fact, we would not have to send our army to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for their two conflicts, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Shield. It is a false rumor that the United States were involved in these two conflicts for oil purposes only. This statement can be backed up due to our past connections with foreign wars, our attack on Iraq in Desert Storm, and the inevitable loss of American life. The United States has been in numerous foreign wars in the past, such as the nearly recent U.S. involvement in Haiti. Seeing as though the United States has the largest army in the world, we can literally conquer anything that we set our minds to invading. Instead, we use our military to help out foreign countries. No one would dare attack us; theyd rather get their joy in destroying smaller, weaker countries. Iraq attacked Kuwait, so we had to intervene. It is a habit for us; more people live if we send in our vast army. If we really needed oil all that badly, we would move in our Goliath-like army and take over Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. If any countries around retaliated, theyd surely be decimated. After the war in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, we kept only the necessary defensive platoons behind. We need not do anything else there, Operation Desert Storm was the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq control, and the following attack against their troops. Apparently, the United States had a grudge against Iraq all along; otherwise, they would have moved their troops out and back to America. Kuwait was in no position to share their oil. We helped them through their struggle, and proceeded to shell and bomb Iraqi strategic defense positions. We need ...

The Job Interviews 7 Deadly Sins

The Job Interviews 7 Deadly Sins Think you know exactly what it takes to land your dream job? Maybe you do. But do you also know what it will take to wind up eliminated from consideration? Unfortunately, even the most qualified candidates can sometimes make the wrong impression †¦ .and cost themselves a job in the process. Don’t fall prey to these seven deadly job hunting â€Å"sins.† 1. The Mass EmailBlindly sending out resume after resume to every job you see not only reeks of desperation, but is also a waste of your time. Sure, versatility is an admirable trait, but so is the ability to play to your strength. Hiring managers value flexibility, but they also prize focus. Not to mention: casting a wide net hauls up as many old fisherman’s boots as it does treasure.The more refined your job search and targeted your resume and cover letter, the more likely you are to hit on the keywords recruiters are looking for in order to advance to the next round.2. Stretching the TruthYes, your resume s hould present you in your very best light. However, it should also present your skills, experience and interests accurately. Even worse than a shoddy or incomplete resume for a hiring manager? One that misrepresents a candidate.Avoid exaggerating your background and/or skill set. Even if you make it past the recruiter, the longer-term consequences of fudging the truth on your resume can be dire if your employee finds out.3. Carelessness CountsIf you think being a few minutes late is no big deal, think again. Not only does showing up late for an interview convey disrespect for the interviewer, but it also demonstrates poor time management. If possible, do a test run before an interview to find out how long transit, parking, walking, etc. will take.Carelessness in appearance is also a deal-breaker for many employers. Keep the old adage in mind: â€Å"Dress for the job you want, not the job you have.† Select your interview outfit at least a day in advance. Is it clean? Pressed? Appropriate? As much as you might like to think that appearance doesn’t matter as much as skill, you will be judged on your appearance. Make sure to take a quick look in the mirror before you walk out the door.4. Lack of PreparationThe internet puts a wealth of information at the fingers of the average job searcher. Failure to use this information is an enormous and often unforgivable oversight. Take time in advance to research the company, industry, and even your interviewer. And be prepared to ask questions. Knowledge and curiosity both demonstrate the above-and-beyond qualities sought by today’s employers.5. Failure to Follow UpThe job interview doesn’t end when you walk out the door. Even if your interview was a slam dunk, you might end up fouling out of the game if you don’t send a thank you note. In fact, 59 percent of HR managers believe that it’s â€Å"very helpful† for promising job candidates to follow up with a thank you note afte r an interview.While a handwritten note on a piece of monogrammed stationery has timeless appeal, 87 percent of hiring managers now believe that email is an acceptable means of expressing your gratitude.How long do you have to send your thank you? Today’s job cycle can move quickly: within 24 hours is ideal.6. No NetworkingNetworking remains an essential part of the job hunt, but it’s an active process, not a passive one. if you attend networking events, make time for one-on-one interactions; these are far more meaningful than group settings.With the rise of social networking, job seekers have 24/7 opportunities for networking. Make sure your social media presence is appropriate and appealing. A quick Google search on your own name can turn up any areas of concern.If you don’t yet have a LinkedIn profile, get one: approximately 93 percent of hiring managers check out LinkedIn when looking for qualified candidates.7. A Single-Pronged ApproachToday’s job hu nt is anything but the linear process it was 20 years ago. There are many channels through which job seekers can interact with recruiting managers. A multi-pronged approach incorporating everything from networking at industry meetings to job boards.

Individual Reflective Report Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Individual Reflective Report - Essay Example The evaluation aims to explore strategic patterns and outcomes, highlighting the approach to strategic decision-making adopted within the group in its handling of strategic issues and tensions like puzzle, dilemma, trade-off or paradox. The report also refers to the core module materials in our discussion. The core module materials refer to attachment and referencing requirements. The report has evidence of strategy, leadership, and significant learning related to strategy and career future. It also includes team behavior, coordination in the group. Good planning, monitoring, evaluating, and enhancing the contribution of the group by setting up comprehensible links between the past, present and future plans and development results. Monitoring and evaluation helps the group to extract information from the past and present, which are used as a basis of pragmatic, fine-tuning, reorientation and future planning (De Wit & Meyer 2010). Effective planning helps to establish whether the grou p work is progressing, moving in the right direction and whether success can be acclaimed in the future. 2.0 Team Role 2.1 Individuals role in the group (a) The group acting product manager The product manager takes the role of comprehending the market demands and trends and aligning those demands to the roadmaps of Vassal Mobile Company. ... (c) Technology officer The technology officer has the role of product innovation and development of its technology as Vassal Technology Officer. The technology officer concentrates on progressive technology products growth and ensuring they are successful to global new markets (Fleischer & Bensoussan 2004). 2.2 My role as the group coordinator As the group chairman, I coordinate the company’s business growth and guide the strategic direction (Fitzroy & Hulbert 2005). I lead and make prosperous technology of the company in the area of Distribution of product, Cable, Mobile and industries of Semiconductor. I lead venture, estimate funds of providers of hardware/software infrastructure concentrating on management of the rich media. I lead innovation and technology development of product as coordinator of Vassal Technology group. In this way, my focus is on creating progressive technology product and to successfully bring these mobile products to new markets. As the team coordinat or, I ensure there are markets of Cable, Internet and Enterprise, as they have grown in the rich media growth. It is through this process that I have comprehended the main technology and drivers of the market and have realized how multiple companies tackle the challenges. 3.0 Strategies 3.1. Strategy management of Vassal Mobile Company group Vassal company experience in sales and marketing, as an initial technology in old and present day media, has set the goal of acquiring 500 clients consisting of the present media, social TV and marketing through the internet. The leading company teams build infrastructure technology in platforms of retail and network while

Ecology and sustainability Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Ecology and sustainability - Assignment Example Nutrients present in the soil, are destroyed by the acidity. Useful micro organisms which release nutrients from decaying organic matter, into the soil are killed off, resulting in less nutrients being available for the plants. The acid rain, falling on the plants damages the waxy layer on the leaves and makes the plant vulnerable to diseases. Acid rain erodes limestone and carbonate stones which are used as building materials upon acid deposition. Though stainless steel and aluminum are more resistant to acid rain, other materials such as carbon-steel, nickel, zinc, copper, paint, and some plastics, paper, leather, and textiles are vulnerable to corrosion by acid rain. b.1. Clean Air Act amendments required that power plants make significant cuts in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions (by installing "scrubbers" in their smokestacks and switching to low-sulfur coal.) b.2 Through the market-based allowance trading system, utilities regulated under the Acid Rain Program decide the most cost-effective way to use available resources to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act. Utilities can reduce emissions by employing energy conservation measures, increasing reliance on renewable energy, reducing usage, employing pollution control technologies, switching to lower sulfur fuel, or developing other alternate strategies. Dobson unit (DU) - One Dobson unit represents the amount of atmospheric ozone that would form a uniform layer 0.01 millimeter (10 micrometers) thick at standard temperature (0 Â °C) and pressure (1 atmosphere or 1013.25 millibars). Because they do not contain chlorine or bromine, HFCs do not deplete the ozone layer (ODP = 0). Some HFCs have high GWPs and are revealed as extremely powerful greenhouse gases which could account for up to 19% of global warming by 2050. It either percolates into the ground and in turn contaminates the groundwater or is discharged into the natural drainage system causing pollution in

The Eurozone Crisis and EU Fiscal Governance Reform

The Eurozone Crisis and EU Fiscal Governance Reform   Framing the Eurozone Crisis: A Case of Limited Ambition Abstract The eurozone crisis provided a new opportunity for obtaining supranational fiscal integration within the European single currency area. This study applies a framing analysis to the crisis discourse that emerged from within the European Union’s (EU) intergovernmental forums involved in fiscal policy coordination. As well as linking policy frames to two different integration scenarios for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the broader influence of macroeconomic ideology is also emphasised. It is found that the response to the intensification of the crisis in Europe was to employ framing devices supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. While there were emergent supranational discourses over the longer term, these were reflective of a limited reform ambition. A key constraining factor here were the sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard circulating amongst member states, which together have ensured that a supranational fiscal policy is unlikely to be obtained i n Europe.   Introduction This article considers the response from within the intergovernmental forums to the eurozone crisis and the future prospects for fiscal supranationalism in Europe more broadly. When political scientists have turned their attention to the politics of the crisis, it has often figured as a case study to support the grand theoretical claims made by the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). This approach has tried to theorize a new paradox in European integration in the post-Maastricht era: ‘Member States pursue more integration but stubbornly resist further supranationalism’ (Puetter 2012, 168). Certain institutional dynamics associated with the new intergovernmentalism can be found to be at work within EMU where, particularly since the onset of the crisis, there have been marked increases in intergovernmental policy coordination within the European Council and ECOFIN Council structures (Hodson 2011; Puetter 2012). However, the approach is still at an early stage of development and deep empirical analysis of the political deliberations and policy environment within these settings are still lacking. Further criticisms have been made. In particular, Schimmelfennig (2015, 724) points out that, ‘They do not distinguish intergovernmentalism and supranationalism by the integration outcomes (either substantive or in terms of the level or scope of integration)’. Thus, claims of an ‘integration paradox’ taking place within EMU specifically or across the wider EU remain uncertain. This article focuses on the issue of EU fiscal governance reform following the intensification of eurozone crisis. The potential role of ideas as engines of policy change within EMU is a prospect taken seriously here (Dyson 2000). With this in mind, the  discursive institutionalist  theoretical framework proposed by Schmidt is employed (Schmidt 2008, 2010). This approach is well suited to considering the role of ideas and discourse interactions in bringing about change in an EU institutional context (see Schmidt 2015). It is applied through a framing analysis of the reform discussions that emerged from within the key intergovernmental forums involved in guiding the crisis response (Goffman 1974). This article identifies the dominant policy frames (‘problems’ and ‘solutions’) organising the reform debate, and links them to two alternative reform paths for EU fiscal governance: intergovernmental and supranational. In doing so, this article clarifies far more precisely the different political and economic policy options for reforming EMU governance, as well as previously underdetermined concepts such as ‘fiscal union’ and ‘political union’. As well as linking individual policy frames to different integration scenarios, the important role of macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences is also emphasised. Theoretical and Methodological Framework It could be assumed that the eurozone crisis would confirm neofunctionalist  beliefs concerning the dynamics of the European integration  process: the weaknesses revealed in the asymmetric single currency area create strong pressures for a functional ‘spillover’ of supranational competencies to the European level (Rosamond 2005). However, when political scientists have turned their attention to the crisis, it has often been directed at the intensified intergovernmental policy coordination that has taken place within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (Hodson 2011; Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). While broader new intergovernmentalist claims of an ‘integration paradox’ in Europe involving integration without supranationalism remain undetermined (see Schimmelfennig 2015), these findings do suggest that deep supranational integration may not be obtained in EMU. Moreover, it has previously been found that a supranational reform agenda was not internalised by the Commission[1]. Together these findings are important as the long-term sustainability of the single currency area without significant steps being taken towards a more deeply integrated fiscal union has been questioned (De Grauwe 2013). Through a framing analysis this article will seek to explore if the crisis response from within the intergovernmental institutions was to push for supranationalism within EU fiscal governance, or alternatively, a retaining of intergovernmental control at the EU level. And, if the later course prevails, it will seek to offer a more complete theoretical explanation of why member states continue to resist supranationalism, even in the face of significant centralisation pressures. A deeper understanding of the political determinants of the EMU policy environment will also help facilitate a more complete explanation of why a supranational reform agenda was found not to have been internalised within DG ECFIN. The overarching theoretical framework informing this analysis is discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008; 2010). Of particular relevance here is the distinction made by discursive institutionalism between ‘coordinative discourse’—which takes place internally within the EU policy making setting—and ‘communicative discourse’—which take place externally between EU policy actors and the general public (Schmidt 2005). This study integrates discursive institutionalism alongside a frame analysis. Framing has been criticised for its lack of consistency in application of theory and method, with many different variants being operationalised without adequate clarification (Cacciatore et al. 2016). Framing has also been found to share common processes with agenda-setting and priming, although framing offers a more ‘encompassing conceptual approach’ (Aday 2006, 768). Here, a sociological approach to framing is adopted, which can be traced back to the work of Goffman (1974). A frame is understood as a ‘schemata of interpretation’, which can shape actors’ perceptions of reality and, in turn, influence political behaviour (Goffman 1974, 21). Inspired by Goffman’s approach, Benford and Snow (2000) make an important distinction between ‘prognostic’ and ‘diagnostic’ framing: the construction of particular  problem representations and possible solutions. This is valuable for facilitating a deeper understanding of the diagnosis of the causes of the eurozone crisis arrived at, as well as an exploration of the interlinking reforms suggested to solve or at least deal with the problems posed by the eurozone crisis.   Ideas within frames can be understood as occurring at different levels of generalisation: specific policy ideas related to problem and solutions (e.g. strengthened rules-based surveillance versus debt mutualisation); normative ideas which attach value to political action (e.g. fiscal discipline versus fiscal solidarity); and finally these can be connected to programmatic ideas related to broader policy paradigms and ideologies (Schmidt 2005; 2008). As a means to locate the key framing ideas that are likely to figure in the institutional discourse on the eurozone crisis, a wider review of the reform literature on EU fiscal governance will be completed (see the section below, ‘Literature Review’). Table (1) helps to link the different problem and solution policy frames that will be uncovered as part of this discussion to two different integration scenarios for EMU: intergovernmental and supranational. As well as showing how ideas relate to different policy measures (proble ms and solutions) and normative arguments, the wider role of macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences for EMU reform is also highlighted here. Following a framing analysis, the dominant frames uncovered will also be explored in relation to the wider interplay between ideas and institutions within EMU[2].   Two guiding macroeconomic ideologies are important for understanding developments in European monetary integration: neoliberalism and Keynesianism. Neoliberalism is a highly contested term, although from an ideological standpoint it favours market based solutions and methods over  government  intervention (Holden 2011). In contrast, perhaps the most important insight of Keynesianism is the recognition of the need for  demand management by the state both in economic downturns and  booms (Skidelsky 1992, 572-624). Keynesian theory, therefore, demands a far more active role for the state in managing the economy through fiscal policy. Neoliberal ideas have been found to have become deeply embedded within the EMU policy framework, including the prevalence of ‘sound money’ and ‘sound finance’ ideas imparting fiscal discipline (Dyson 2002). There is no prior reason why neoliberalism should be associated with intergovernmentalism and Keynesianism with supranationalism. However, when applied to events taking place during the eurozone crisis, a Keynesianism philosophy demands a level of centralised fiscal solidarity amongst member states, which would imply edging towards a more supranational model of fiscal integration. On the contrary, building on, rather than replacing, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) arrangements for fiscal discipline would preserve the intergovernmental logic of EMU governance, and is more aligned with neoliberal preferences. The focus here is on the framing activities that took place within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the informal ‘eurogroup’), althoughthese frames will also be located in the context of the wider crisis discussions taking place within the EU Commission and ECB settings. The analysis distinguishes between two distinct phases of the eurozone crisis: a crisis ‘escalation’ and crisis ‘normalisation’ phase. The crisis escalation phase can be traced back to the intensification of the global financial crisis in the summer of 2007. With attention focused on the frailties of the American financial system, the eurozone economy at first assumed a ‘safe-haven’ status for many commentators (Wyplosz 2009)—although there was some prescient warnings as to the multiple risks the downturn could pose to the institutions of the European single currency area (Feldstein 2008). In early 2010, following significant upwards revisions in the budget deficit figures for Greece,   there was a sudden erosion in market confidence in the Eurozone leading tolong-term government bond yield spreads increasing dramatically for the periphery member states (Checherita et al. 2010). With the risk of sovereign default  and uncontrollable  contagion  effects at its most serious, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, swiftly put together a case for the supremacy of a European Council led Task Force in guiding a ‘fast-track’ process for EMU reform.    By the fall of 2012, market reactions towards the eurozone had normalised significantly. Key here was the ECB fulfilling its function as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2016, 126-141), which was aided by Mario Draghi’s  statement at the end of July 2012 that ‘[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to  do whatever it takes  to preserve the euro’. In response to the calming in market conditions, the attention of European leaders switched to the measures required to stabilise EMU over the longer term. Laying the foundations for these reform discussions were two strategic documents: the December 2012 report, prepared at the request of the European Council by President Van Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission, the ECB, and the Eurogroup, entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and the Commission’s own A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European Debate, published in November 2012. Building on the previous documents, in June 2015, the President of the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidents of the Council, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, presented the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ entitled Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Official documents and speeches throughout these deliberation phases will be supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews that were conducted with senior EU officials located within the European Council, ECOFIN Council and DG ECFIN during the most important phases of the crisis. It is important to differentiate between the full internalisation of discourse within institutions and discourse that is deployed in rhetoric as a strategic political device (Hay 2006). Interview data is then useful for forming a comparison between communicative discourses to the general public and the internal coordinative discourses of policy construction taking place among policy actors (Schmidt 2008). Literature Review The escalation of the Eurozone crisis in 2010 fixed attention on the design failures of the eurozone and the practicalities of having a monetary union without the accompanying integration of the fiscal side (De Grauwe 2013). Since 2010, most of the reform proposals suggested to complete the architecture of EMU have centred on the prospect of implementing two neo-Keynesian fiscal solidarity mechanisms: 1) centralised fiscal capacity (or federal budget) for stabilisation purposes; 2) and the introduction of debt mutualisation schemes. A Policy Contribution for Bruegel details the four main options for developing a fiscal capacity for the eurozone with stabilisation functions: 1) unemployment insurance; 2) payments related to deviations of output from potential; 3) the narrowing of large spreads; 4) and discretionary spending (Wolf 2012). Suggestions for debt mutualisation include the so called European Safe Bonds (Euro-nomics group 2011) and Redemption bonds (Bofinger et al. 2011). In view of the salient features of fiscal policy, it is understood as imperative that progress towards a more supranational fiscal union is accompanied by deeper political integration to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of EMU governance (Schmidt, 2015). Despite calls being made for EMU to be completed through a process of supranational fiscal integration, there is an altogether different integration route that would maintain the intergovernmental logic of fiscal arrangements in Europe. Neoliberal monetarist principles are pervasive here, with discussions of fiscal solidarity being disregarded in favour of a limited fiscal discipline agenda (von Hagen et al. 2009; 2011). The main concern under this integration scenario is with heightened budgetary surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, which could be secured under the preventative and corrective arms of the pre-existing SGP framework. The fundamentally decentralised character of EU fiscal governance would also be preserved. In the literature, support for such a limited reform agenda is often supported by a belief that the eurozone crisis was primarily the result of excessive  fiscal profligacy  in the periphery member states (Sinn 2010). Of course, the distinct lack of political integration envisioned here would mean that channels of democratic legitimacy would remain largely indirect via member state governments. Through this discussion of the literature, two reform scenarios for EMU have been identified: intergovernmental and supranational. These two models can be understood as being supported by a selection of different policy  frames,  implying different definitions of what the  problem is and different ideas of what the suitable policy solutions  may be (see Table 1). First, the intergovernmental reform scenario is guided by a simplistic fiscal profligacy diagnosis of the eurozone crisis. Such an interpretation of the crisis strongly implies neoliberal policy solutions in the form of strengthened rules-based fiscal discipline. Framing the crisis in these more limited terms may also be both politically and intellectually attractive. This is because these frames do not demand challenging integration steps being taken towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union. Alternatively, the more far reaching supranational reform scenario is informed by a broader interpretation of the crisis problem as a problem of regional imbalances. In turn, possible solutions are understood as going far beyond neoliberal fiscal discipline in the direction of the implementation of neo-Keynesian solidarity measures, including debt mutualisation and an enlarged EU budget. The need to ensure the democratic legitimacy for decisions taken at the Union level is also problematized under this integration scenario, leading to demands for the simultaneous development of a flanking political union. Table 1: Framing the Eurozone Crisis Building on [name deleted for peer review] Framing the Eurozone Crisis   Crisis Escalation Phase Following the intensification of the global financial crisis in July 2007, the eurozone was at first considered by some to be a ‘safe haven’ (Wyplosz 2009). With the full implications of the deepening global financial crisis for the eurozone not yet apparent, the crisis problem was initially framed by European leaders as one created externally by the financial excesses built-up within the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economies. As one DG ECFIN official observed, ‘Governments believed the crisis to have originated primarily in poor regulatory practices in New York and Londonand Europe was being pulled into the crisis through the global financial system’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). A similar sentiment was also reflected in more communicative discourse as European leaders attempted to externalise the crisis. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was uncompromising in asserting before the German Bundestag that ‘excessively cheap money in the US was a driver of today’s crises’ (Financial Times 2008). Moreover, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, proclaimed in similar terms that ‘the crisis was a product of the Anglo-Saxon model’ (Financial Times 2009). Despite European leaders framing the 2008 financial collapse as an almost exclusively ‘Anglo-Saxon’ phenomenon with epicentres in New York and London, European leaders, led by Nicolas Sarkozy as the then acting president of the Council, did push for a strong coordinated European response alongside the G20 and American economies (Hodson 2011). In this early period, the framing of solutions to the crisis in Europe, overlapping with the international response and IMF recommendations, was guided heavily by Keynesian principles as leaders sought to avert financial contagion and recessionary spillovers into the real economy through coordinated fiscal expansion. In Europe, this translated into an attempt to combine both national and EU resources to ‘support demand’ and ‘cushion economies from the worst effects of the financial meltdown’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 1 2013). In November 2008, after an extraordinary summit of the euro area Heads of Government led by Nicolas  Sarkozy, the Commission proposed a Keynesian ‘European Economic Recovery plan’ (ECRP), which championed a substantial coordinated fiscal stimulus: ‘The Commission is proposing that, as a matter of urgency, Member States and the EU agree to an immediate budgetary impulse amounting to â‚ ¬ 200 billion (1.5% of GDP)’(Commission 2008). Importantly though, a key principal underpinning the plan was that any budgetary stimulus should be ‘timely, targeted, and temporary’—and that ‘Member States should commit to reverse the budgetary deterioration and return to the aims set out in the [SGP’s] medium term objectives’ (Commission 2008, 6-7).   As Joaquà ­n Almunia,  Vice President  of the European Commission, commented at the time: ‘we have red lines,  we cannot  put an excessive  burden  on  the next generation’ (Commission 2008a, 6). Similarly, the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council continued to support the long-term application of the SGP: ‘we remain fully committed to sound and sustainable public finances. The Stability and Growth Pact provides adequate flexibility to deal with these exceptional situations’ (Council 2009). Thus, while European leaders led by Nicolas  Sarkozy, along with the broader international community, embraced more Keynesian orientated fiscal stimulus in order to counter the expected downward trend in demand presented by the intensification of the global financial crisis, the long-term European commitment to the neoliberal rules-based SGP framework remained relatively stable during this early crisis period.   In the Spring of 2010 Greek public debt was downgraded by the main credit rating agencies to junk status and a growing spread in yields emerged in Eurozone sovereign bonds (Checherita et al. 2010). Recalling these events later, President Van Rompuy noted that this sudden loss of confidence in the Eurozone provoked by Greece was a ‘real shock’ for which ‘we were not prepared’ (Council 2014). As one official in DG ECFIN remarked: ‘It was now internal: a crisis of the Eurozone’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). As the crisis intensified within the eurozone it was reframed by European leaders as a problem of fiscal profligacy amongst the periphery member states. On 11 February 2010, in a short emergency statement issued by Heads of State, they remarked that ‘all euro members must conduct sound national policies in accordance with the agreed rules’ (Council 2010). The discussion was also centred on Greece, with the Greek government being told ‘to implement all these measures in a rigorous and determined manner to effectively reduce the budgetary deficit by 4% in 2010’ (Council 2010). From a reading of the coordinative discourse, it was now Germany that was seen to be providing ideational leadership for framing the crisis in behavioural terms on Greek fiscal profligacy. As the largest eurozone country of course Germany’s voice was perhaps louder than the rest. I think it is fair to say that there was a perception in Germany that the troubles in the sovereign debt market had been caused by excessive government spending by certain periphery member states. (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). The Commission also concurred with these views. In fact, the EU executive took the unprecedented step of issuing a series of strict recommendations to ensure that the budget deficit of Greece was brought below 3% of GDP by 2012 (Commission 2010a). Joaquà ­n Almunia,  Vice President  of the European Commission, commented that ‘this is the first time we have established such an intense and quasi-permanent system of monitoring’ (Commission 2010a). In response to the escalating crisis in the eurozone, President Van Rompuy argued the case in March 2010 for the pre-eminence of a European Council led Task Force in driving reform negotiations on EMU governance. The framing of policy solutions within the framework of the Task Force setting was guided more by a neoliberal ideology towards the imposition of strengthened intergovernmental fiscal discipline. In the first statement issued by the Task Force on the 25 March 2010, the shift in policy responses by European leaders was already firmly established: ‘the current situation demonstrates the need to strengthen and complement the existing framework to ensure fiscal sustainability in the euro zone’ (European Council 2010b). Moreover, the final conclusions of the March 2010 European Council summit further instructed the Task Force ‘to identify the measures needed  to  reach  the  objective  of an improved crisis resolution framework and  better budgetary disciplineexploring all options to reinforce the existing legal framework’ (European Council 2010a). Again, in the coordinative discourse, officials drew attention to the renewed ideational leadership played by Germany in framing policy solutions for the crisis: You have to understand that for Germany in particular the idea of having enforceable rules and sanctions to maintain budgetary discipline is central to their vision of how EMU should operate. And during the crisis it was Germany that pressed the hardest for heighted budgetary surveillance (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President, 2014). A separate official commented on what they perceived as the inevitably of Germany’s leading role in setting the reform priorities within the task force: ‘But of course Germany takes a leading role here in view of its economic size. So Germany automatically was seen to take on a leading role, whether it wanted it or not ‘(Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). In contrast, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy led continued pleas for more fiscal solidarity: ‘The euro is our currency. It implies solidarity. There can be no doubt on the expression of this solidarity’ (BBC 2010). However, while it has been observed that ‘France under the stewardship of Sarkozy also had a role to play here’, it has been noted that he, in effect, was ‘forced to concede too many of Germany’s demands during the crisis deliberations’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). Thus, while Nicolas Sarkozy played an important role in leading a more Keynesian international response at the onset of the global financial crisis, as the crisis intensified within the eurozone the French President was forced to abandon solutions involving fiscal solidarity in favour of Germany’s more limited fiscal discipline objectives.    These framing priorities were reflected in the Final Report of the Task Force released to the public in October 2010. The main pillar of the suggested reforms was geared towards ‘greater fiscal discipline through a stronger stability and growth pact’ (European Council 2010, 3-4).   As part of its ongoing institutional dialogue with the Task Force, the ECB also offered its public support for legislative measures supporting a more rigorous  Ã¢â‚¬Ëœquasi-automatic’ implementation of the SGP rules (ECB 2010). Three key objectives were embedded in the Final Report of the Task Force: ‘the need for a greater focus on debt and fiscal sustainability’, ‘to reinforce compliance’ and ‘to ensure that national fiscal frameworks reflect the EUs fiscal rules’ (European Council 2010, 1-12). In remarks following the final meeting of the Task Force, President Van Rompuy documented that the ‘task forces commitment to a stronger Pact was high from the beginning to the end’ (European Council 2010c). Converging with the framing   activities of the Task Force, in September 2010 the Commission proposed the so-called ‘six-pack’ of legislative proposals centred on the concept of ‘prudent fiscal policy-making’ (Commission 2010, 1). These ‘fast-tracked’ proposals sought to strengthen the impact and effectiveness of the preventative arm of the SGP by giving it ‘teeth’ (EU Commission 2010, 4-5). These early framing activities led by deliberations within the Task Force also helped set the subsequent policy agenda in the form of a legislative ‘two-pack’ (proposed in November 2011) and intergovernmental ‘fiscal compact’ (agreed 8-9 December 2011). Building on the legislative six-pack, both measures were limited to strengthening intergovernmental fiscal discipline under the SGP, through strengthened budgetary surveillance and reinforced compliance (see Commission 2012). Crisis Normalisation Phase From the summer of 2012 to the winter of 2013 there was a gradual reduction in the eurozone periphery bond yield spreads. Key here was the ECB fulfilling its function as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2013; 2016). With the ECB able to temporarily normalise market reactions within the eurozone, it offered the prospect that European leaders may seek to reframe the crisis as demanding more supranational solutions. This assumption appeared to be confirmed when President Herman Van Rompuy, following a European Council summit at the end of June 2012, first mentioned the prospect of laying down a ‘longer-term vision’ for strengthening EMU (European Council 2012c). Following prior negotiations in the European Council, President Van Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission, the ECB, and the Eurogroup, presented in December 2012 a report entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. However, despite the possibility of a critical juncture event, the framing of policy solutions within the report continued to prioritise the strengthening of intergovernmental fiscal discipline over the short-term. The near term priority is to complete and implement the new steps for stronger economic governanceThe other elements related to strengthening fiscal governance in the euro area (‘Two-Pack’), which are still in the legislative process, should be finalised urgently and be implemented thoroughly (European Council 2012, 8). These reform priorities were also reflected in the coordinative discourse: ‘The priority has remained the implementation of the measures contained in the ‘‘six-pack’’ and ‘‘two-pack’’ proposals’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). And again, Germany’s ideational leadership in framing policy solutions was observed to be pivotal here: ‘There is an understanding amongst member states that budget discipline has to be ensured before more financial support can be offered. This is also a German insistence’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official, 2013). Moreover, while the ECB internally called for a ‘quantum leap’ in integration within EMU, this was strictly interpreted in terms of ‘further strengthening the budgetary discipline of the euro area Member States’ (ECB 2012:8). When discussing the reform solutions for implementation over the long-term (five years and more), there was a shift in the discourse of the Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union report towards the language of supranationalism. However, these framing devices were only reflective of a limited reform ambition. For example, the report mentions the possibility of gradually developing a ‘fiscal capacity’, which could help ‘cushion the impact of country-specific shocks’ and ‘prevent contagion across the euro area’ (European Council 2012, 9). Yet the precise form that any fiscal capacity should take within the euro area was left vague, with the report acknowledging that ‘the exact conditions and thresholds for the activation of transfers would need to be studied carefully’ (European Council 2012, 11). Moreover, it was also emphasised that the development of a fiscal capacity within the eurozone should ‘not lead to  permanent transfers  between countries’ and that this process should occur ‘without resorting to the mutualisation of sovereign debt’ (European Council 2012, 10-12). Tellingly, within the subsequent Conclusions of the December 2012 European Council, any mention of a fiscal capacity or shock absorption function for EMU was omitted, along with plans for debt-mutualisation (European Council   2012a). In the coordinative discourse, officials were able to account for the limited ambition shown in framing supranational solutions to the eurozone crisis by pointing towards a mixture of sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard amongst member states. For example, one official highlighted the constraining influence of these national interest ideas on integration within EMU: A degree of debt mutualisation or financial risk sharing could, in theory, help lower borrowing costs amongst the periphery member states and help ward off pressure from the financial markets but it effectively means the transfer of sovereignty, at least to some extent. That is the biggest obstacle: that is what it is all about. In the end it comes down to sovereignty and money (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). Similar ideas were raised by one official who, when asked to comment on the probability of securing supranational fiscal integration, answered candidly: ‘I think it is not very probable because of state sovereignty concerns’ (Advisor to the Cabinet of the European Council President 2014). The official argued that this is because a ‘fiscal union with tax powers going to the European Union level would be completely turning upside down the way the Union is currently running’ (Advisor to the Cabinet of the European Council President 2014). A separate official also drew attention to the importance of ‘concerns of moral hazard’, predominantly amongst the ‘core member states who want to be able to influence the periphery member states’ debt situation’ (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President 2014). There were also discussions in the Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union report concerning the development of a flanking ‘political union’ aspect, although again the supranational framing of the discourse was lacking in ambition.   In order to underpin the ‘democratic legitimacy and accountability’ of decision making the report called for the ‘the involvement of the European Parliament as regards accountability for decisions taken at the European level’, while at the same time ‘maintaining the pivotal role of national parliaments, as appropriate’ (European Council 2012, 16-17). The promise to maintain a ‘pivotal’ role for national parliaments, even in the event of a vertical transfer of powers to the European level, would appear to stem from an observation made in the report that ‘decisions on national budgets are at the heart of Member States parliamentary democracies’ (European Council 2012, 16). The report, then, explicitly divorced itself from supranational political solutions. In the coordinative discourse, sovereignty concerns were again raised as major hurdle to political integration: ‘People have different interests and different concepts of what a political union would be and as to what sovereign powers should be transferred’—adding that ‘we are not even discussing this’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). In November 2012 the Commission published its own Communication outlining A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European Debate. Converging with the Van Rompuy report, the immediate framing of policy solutions was restricted to fiscal discipline objectives: ‘immediate priority should be given to the full deployment of the new economic governance tools brought by the ‘‘six-pack’’ as well as rapid adoption of current Commission proposals such as the ‘‘two-pack’’ (Commission 2012, 12). Once again, like the Van Rompuy report, the blueprint did cautiously embed more supranational frames when addressing the long-term reform agenda for EMU (five years and more). This is in keeping with the EU Commission’s pledge that ‘steps towards more responsibility and economic discipline should be combined with more solidarity and financial support’ (EU Commission 2012, 11). Accordingly, the framing of solutions shifted to demand more in the way of fiscal solidarity, with tentative ideas for a ‘fiscal capacity’ (or ‘federal budget’) and even ‘debt mutualisation’ schemes being   aired as possibilities ‘to support member states in the absorption of economic shocks’ (Commission 2012, 25-26). However, these solidarity mechanisms were envisioned as being implemented strictly after the new arrangements for fiscal discipline have been fully implemented. Also, the procedural details and legal basis for the solidarity mechanisms was left vague, with proposal covering options from ‘contractual arrangements’ to an ‘insurance’ type system. As one official commented: ‘I think there needs to be some ingredients of fiscal union. It’s not entirely clear which ones and to what extent; there are different views and these are tricky questions’ (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN 2013). Moreover, the blueprint also shied away from committing itself to any process of supranational political integration, with the EU Commission arguing that the ‘the Lisbon Treaty has perfected the EUs unique model of supranational democracy’ (Commission 2012, 35).   In June 2015, the President of the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidents of the Council, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, presented the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ entitled Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. It is notable that in the updated report the framing of policy solutions for fiscal integration was even less ambitious than it had been in earlier institutional reports drafted during earlier periods of the crisis. Apart from repeating the need to improve compliance with the new rules contained in the ‘six-pack’, ‘two-pack’ and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, there were no institutional innovations suggested for implementation over the short-term. Instead, intergovernmental fiscal discipline was again framed as the priority solution—with repeated references made to ‘responsible budgetary policies’ (Commission 2015, 14). The report also warned that ‘every Member State must stick to the rules, or the credibility of this framework is at risk’ (Commission 2015, 14-15).   In terms of the framing of solutions over the longer-term (five years or more), previous references to a ‘fiscal capacity’ and limited forms of debt mutualisation were completely omitted. Instead, the Five Presidents tentatively floated the idea of a ‘euro area-wide fiscal stabilisation function’ (Commission 2015, 14-15). Postponed strictly for ‘in the longer term’, the development of such a   function is envisioned as the culmination of a process of ‘convergence’ and ‘further pooling’ of decision-making on national budgets (Commission 2015, 14-155).   The report also cautioned that ‘it should not lead to permanent transfers between countries’ and that efforts should be made to ‘guarantee it is consistent with the existing EU fiscal framework’ (Commission 2015, 15). Tellingly the report was also explicit that ‘the exact design of such euro area stabilisers requires more in-depth work’ (Commission 2015, 14). As part of the Commission Presidents’ 2015 ‘State of the Union’ address, he argued for ‘a more effective and democratic system of economic and fiscal surveillance’ (Commission 2015a). However, there was again a noticeable lack of progress on political union. While the report affirmed ‘a key role for the European Parliament and national Parliaments’, practical steps to ensure the democratic legitimacy of decision making were limited to proposals to consolidate the external representation of the euro and the integration intergovernmental solutions (i.e. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) within the EU legal framework (Commission 2015, 17-18). Framing in Context The dominant framing activities uncovered need to be understood in the context of the wider EMU policy environment. One of the key foundations of EMU was the ideational consensus reached in Europe on neoliberal economic principles in the 1980’s (McNamara 1998). However, while there developed a relative consensus that monetary policy would function in accordance with neoliberal principles, very little thought was given during the deliberations at Maastricht on the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) as to the possibility of accompanying these integration steps with progress towards a supranational fiscal union. As Verdun commented:   ‘Fiscal policy harmonisation was just simply one step too far; there was no support for a transfer of sovereignty over these matters to the European level’ (Verdun 1998, 122). From an early stage, therefore, political necessity dictated that fiscal policy would remain firmly in the intergovernmental realm. Yet from the perspective of underpinning EMU with an institutional framework that is in keeping with neoliberal ideas of ‘sound money’ and ‘sound finance’ (Dyson 2002), European economic and monetary integration was not completed at Maastricht. It was against this backdrop that the then German Minister for finance, Theo Waigel, advanced a proposal for a rules-based ‘Stability Pact for Europe’ in 1996. In summary, owning to the political constraints preventing fiscal supranationalism, coupled with the importation of neoliberal ideas, intergovernmental fiscal discipline became institutionalised at heart of EMU early on. Since its formation, the course of EU fiscal governance reform has been characterised by a strong ‘path-dependency’ (Pierson 1996). In fact, in view of the path-dependent constraints of the political environment, on top of the prevailing neoliberal ideational consensus, the rules-based framework for EU fiscal governance was never seriously challenged by European leaders throughout the first ten years of the single currency area (see Heipertz and Verdun 2011. While the onset of the eurozone crisis had the potential to represent a ‘critical juncture’ in the path for EMU integration (Bulmer 1994), the revival of concerns amongst member states over sovereignty and moral hazard have continued to render the intergovernmental structure of EMU a political necessity. However, although the minimal structure of EMU remains a manifestation of different conceptions of national interest, the prevailing neoliberal ideology has simultaneously continued to condition perceptions as to the efficacy of the SGP rules-based framework for fiscal discipline. Thus, while French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in tandem with the international community, was seen to be influential in leading a brief resurgence of more Keynesian oriented demand stimulus during the early stages of the crisis, European leaders defended the continued application of the SGP as the overarching framework for EU fiscal governance. The dramatic shift in early 2010 from ‘Anglo-Saxon’ external excesses to the internal vulnerabilities within the eurozone only exaggerated the path-dependent effect of competing national interests amongst member states while reinforcing the reversion to neoliberal solutions.   First, policy makers were responding with a degree of shock and panic to a crisis of potentially ‘existential proportions’ (as termed by a Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President, 2014). Operating in this environment of crisis, diagnosing the crisis in behavioural terms as resulting from fiscal profligacy and offering intergovernmental reform solutions limited to strengthening the SGP would have been both intellectually and politically attractive. Not only were these policy frames fully in line with the neoliberal logic of ‘sound  money  and finance’ enshrined since Maastricht (Dyson 2002), but they could also be implemented via secondary legislation under the current legal basis provided by the SGP framework. Moreover, buttressed by its economic weight and its considerable structural power within the EMU set-up, Germany was also increasingly in a strong position to provide ideational leadership in framing neoliberal solutions to the crisis. This can be contrasted with France who, as the crisis progressed, was forced to abandon more Keynesian solutions in favour of Germany’s more limited fiscal discipline objectives. Conclusion The intensification of the crisis within the eurozone brought with it a marked intensification of intergovernmental policy coordination within EMU. As the crisis progressed, the response by European leaders was to adopt problem and solution frames supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. Importantly, these frames were intellectually attractive as they were fully consistent with the neoliberal foundations underpinning EMU governance. Also, these frames were politically simple to express as they could be implemented in full under the pre-existing SGP legal framework. While there was a partial shift in the discourse towards supranationalism following the normalisation of the crisis, these discourses were always reflective of a limited reform ambition. In this context, a supranational framing of the crisis was found to be limited by constraining ideas of national interest concerning state sovereignty and issues moral hazard. Germany was also able to draw on its economic weight and bargaining power to provide ideational leadership, further directing the reform agenda towards intergovernmental fiscal discipline. In relation to the wider literature, these findings are broadly consistent with ‘new intergovernmentalist’ claims that supranationalism is unlikely to be obtained in the post Maastricht integration phase. This study though has helped develop a deeper political understanding of the current integration impasse in EU fiscal governance, and of the ideational and institutional path-dependencies working to limit the scope for far reaching reform. This analysis has also contributed to existing critical analysis on European integration by emphasising the central importance of neoliberal ideology in guiding framing preferences. Finally, one major consequence of these findings is that the imbalance between monetary and fiscal integration within the EMU framework will likely remain. However, further investigation will be needed to assess the long-term sustainability of running a single currency area with a decentralised system of fiscal policy. 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Tom Clancy’s Net Force: Changing of the Guards Book Report

Tom Clancy’s Net Force: Changing of the Guards Book Report Looking for a book that will wake you up and make you wonder about the covert world of computer crime and computer crime-fighters? Look no further! Tom Clancy’s Net Force: Changing of the Guards is a book that will keep you reading until you fall asleep! Changing of the Guards, written by Steve Perry and Larry Segriff is set in the Net Force world, which was created by Tom Clancy and Steve Pieczenik. Set in 2013, ten years after it was written, it is our world just with much more advanced computer systems and technological devices. It is based around Net Force HQ, a â€Å"secret† base much like the FBI has at Quantico, that a government agency is based out of to detect and end computer crime. There are a few major players in the series and a few villains unique to this novel. Alex Michaels is the head of Net Force, who is stepping down from that position. Tom Thorn is the officer who is taking his place. Jay Gridley is the best computer operator on the good side of the law. John Howard is the head of military operations, who is also stepping down. Abe Kent is taking his place. A few of their wives play minor roles in the story. Sam Cox is the main villain of the novel, who, he and his company are worth billions of dollars, and he was a soviet spy in his youth. Eduard Natadze is a Georgian hitman for Cox who is a serious classical guitar player. This story is set up in the common style; bad guy appears, bad guy appears to win, bad guy gets defeated. In the beginning, Jay is working in decrypting a list of old soviet spies. Cox orders Natadze to capture Jay, but the plan he comes up with goes bad and Jay ends up getting hit with a bullet fragment in the head. He goes into a coma that is deeper than it should be because of a past injury. While he is in the coma, Alex, Tom, John, and Abe hunt for Natadze. However, they can not find any leads. Things seem dire, until Jay wakes himself out of the coma he is in. He, along with a few sudden realizations, manage to hunt down Natadze. However, they can not connect him to Cox with evidence that will hold up in court. To take Cox down, they trick Natadze into thinking Cox tried to kill him so he would kill Cox. My favorite part of the book is the coma. Jay is stuck in a coma, and he realizes this, so he devises a plan. He woke up from the last coma by strengthening the brain waves from alpha to beta to theta to delta waves. Each step requires more concentration. To do this, in the dreamlike coma, he creates an event like he does with VR simms, or virtual reality simulations. He creates a strong man competition in his mind, where he challenges the four wave strengths. He defeats Alpha easily. Beta also falls easily before him. Theta is the first real challenge, and he barely defeats him. As he challenges Delta, he realizes that he needs to focus on the challenge, not on defeating Delta. Doing so enables him to create delta waves in his brain and wake himself up out of the coma. There is one main underlying idea in this story. At the end, after Natadze is tricked into killing his boss, Jay finishes decrypting the list of soviet agents. On this list, that Cox was supposedly on, he is not listed! The idea behind this could be interpreted in two different ways. One is criminal activity never pays off. The other is let sleeping dogs lie, for if you kick it, it will wake up and bite you. This book is a must read for any Tom Clancy fan. It is set in the Net Force setting that is comparable to the original â€Å"Jack Ryan† series. It is written very well, and it will not disappoint anyone who likes Tom Clancy. However, I would not recommend this book unless you have read the whole series up to this book. There are more than a few things that, unless you have read the series, you will not get. This book was written with Clancy fans in mind. While there is a large series put out by Clancy that is continuously being lengthened, there are many people that are daunted by the size of his books, and many that have finished all of his books. This book was written with these people in mind, as it is written in Clancy’s style but it is only 318 pages. If I could save any one character in this book from disaster, it would be the very minor character, Tyrone, Alex Michaels son. I identify with him, as in this book and other books, he goes through struggles like I have. He also goes through more than any teenager should need to. He shoots and kills an assassin that is trying to kill his dads coworker and his pregnant wife. This books ending is wonderful. I love how the evil peon, (Natadze), gets away while the evil kingpin, (Cox), dies. In most books, the minion dies and the kingpin gets away. Also, I like how the good guy, (Thorn), bends the law to make sure that Cox does not get away. The person that I would like to have as a friend is Jay Gridley. He does not care about himself, he only cares about his country, his family, and his friends. If there were more people like him in the world, not only would the world IQ average go up, the world would be a better place. The book Tom Clancy’s Net Force: Changing of the Guards Book Report is a great book that will hook you in and not let you free until you finish it. A must read for all Clancy fans, it has characters that go much deeper than just a name.